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Attribution of Stock Ownership from Stock Options
Under the Internal Revenue Code
The distribution of stock ownership is important for determin-
ing the application of many substantive provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code. For example, certain tax provisions apply only if the
number of shareholders does not exceed a set maximum' or if partic-
ular shareholders own a specified minimum percentage of stock. In
determining whether an individual owns stock, the tax law often
considers beneficial as well as legal ownership. Stock ownership may
be attributed to a party under a judicial or statutory presumption
that the party controls or derives benefit from the stock.3
This comment analyzes the Code's treatment of whether the
holder of a stock option4 should be treated as owning the stock
I For example, a corporation generally can qualify as a Subchapter S corporation only if
it has ten or fewer shareholders. I.R.C. §§ 1371-1379; see text and notes at notes 33-36 infra.
Similarly, a corporation may be subject to the 70% personal holding company tax only if five
or fewer shareholders own more than 50% of the stock. I.R.C. § 542(a)(2); see text and notes
at notes 57-58 infra.
2 For example, the transfer of property to a corporation in return for its stock or securities
is not taxed if the transferor owns 80% of the corporation's stock after the transfer. I.R.C. §
351(a); see text and notes at notes 19-21 infra.
I Under some provisions, an irrebuttable presumption of control or benefit applies to
stock owned by various family members, treating an individual as owning the stock owned
by members of his family. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 267(c)(2), (4), 318(a)(1), 544(a)(2), 1563(e)(6).
The presumption also applies to stock owned by corporations, partnerships, trusts, and es-
tates in which a party has an interest. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 267(c)(1), 318(a)(2), 544(a)(1),
1563(e)(2)-(4), 4943(d)(1).
I Neither the Code nor the regulations define the term "stock option." The best guidance
is found in a revenue ruling that defines options for the purpose of applying the constructive
ownership rules of § 318 to a stock redemption. Rev. Rul. 601, 1968-2 C.B. 124. Under this
ruling an option exists only if the holder has the right to obtain the underlying stock at his
election and if the election is not subject to any contingencies. Prior to this ruling commenta-
tors had expressed concern that defining options to include a buy-sell agreement, which
typically becomes operative only upon death, retirement, or other future events, would create
tax consequences differing greatly from those expected by the parties. See, e.g., Goldstein,
Attribution Rules: Undue Multiplicity, Complexity Can Create Liabilities, 15 TuL. TAX INST.
384 (1965); Ringle, Surrey & Warren, Attibution of Stock Ownership in the Internal Revenue
Code, 72 HARv. L. REv. 209 (1958). This ruling assuages these concerns by excluding contin-
gent purchase arrangements from the definition of option. A set of attribution rules proposed
by the ABA's Section on Taxation also excludes a buy-sell agreement from option attribution
by requiring attribution from options only where no substantial contingencies beyond the
control of the grantee exist. See Comm. on Affiliated & Related Corps., Committee
Recommendations, 21 TAX LAw. 921 (1968) [hereinafter cited as ABA Proposed Attribution
Rules]; note 8 infra.
A stock option can therefore be defined as a unilateral right to acquire stock at the
election of the optionholder. An option may or may not have an expiration date and typically
requires the holder to provide additional consideration for the stock.
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underlying the option for purposes of applying various tax provi-
sions. The current law governing the attribution of stock ownership
from options has been criticized as inconsistent.5 Some provisions
treat the optionholder as owning the underlying stock;6 others have
no stated rules,7 leaving the issue to be decided case by case. A
uniform treatment of attribution to optionholders, however, would
be inappropriate because attribution rules must accommodate the
differing purposes of the various Code provisions.
This comment examines the treatment of optionholders under
illustrative Code sections' and evaluates the relevant attribution
rules in light of the purposes of those sections. In the first provisions
considered, attribution to optionholders is neither provided for nor
appropriate. This category includes sections dealing with corporate
organization" and reorganization," Subchapter S corporations,' 2
and consolidated returns.'" Next, those sections presently requiring
excessive attribution are examined. They include the provisions
See, e.g., Hawkins, Treatment of Stock Options for Attribution Purposes: Unsatisfac-
tory and Inconsistent, 44 J. TAx 80 (1976); Reilly, An Approach to the Simplification and
Standardization of the Concepts "The Family," "Related Parties," "Control," and
"Attribution of Ownership," 15 TAx L. Rev. 253 (1960); Ringel, Surrey & Warren, supra note
4.
£ See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 318(a)(4), 544(a)(3), 1563(e)(1).
See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 267(c), 368(c), 1371, 1504, 4943(d).
'The ABA Proposed Attribution Rules provide:
Options.-If any person has an option to acquire stock, such stock shall be considered
as being owned by such person. For purposes of this paragraph,-
(A) an option will not result in attribution if it is not exercisable within 3 years of
the date of determination of constructive stock ownership, if on such date it is subject
to substantial contingencies beyond the control of the optionee, or if on such date the
option price exceeds 150 percent of the fair market value of the stock subject to such
option;
(B) an option to acquire an option, and each one of a series of such options, shall
be considered as an option to acquire such stock; and
(C) in determining the percentage stock ownership of an optionee of stock which
is not issued and outstanding, such stock shall be considered as issued and outstanding.
ABA Proposed Attribution Rules, supra note 4, at 923.
The holding period and the basis of the stock underlying options, although related to
the ownership of stock underlying options, will not be discussed. The dispute concerning
treatment of options on unissued stock has been discussed elsewhere and will not be explored
here. See Sorem v. Commissioner, 334 F.2d 275 (10th Cir. 1964); Bloch v. United States, 261
F. Supp. 597 (S.D. Tex. 1966), affd per curiam, 386 F.2d 839 (5th Cir. 1967); Rev. Rul. 601,
1968-2 C.B. 124; Hawkins, supra note 5. See also ABA Proposed Attribution Rules, supra note
4, at 923. The provisions discussed in this comment were selected to exemplify the types of
problems concerning stock ownership attribution found throughout the Internal Revenue
Code.
' I.R.C. § 351.
" I.R.C. § 368.
': I.R.C. § 1371.
'3 I.R.C. § 1504.
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dealing with personal holding companies, 14 stock redemptions,,5 and
controlled corporations." These sections sweep too broadly in failing
to distinguish between abusive and nonabusive transactions; attri-
bution rules having a less restrictive effect are recommended. The
final sections discussed presently provide for inadequate option at-
tribution. Specifically, the provisions dealing with the excess busi-
ness holdings tax'7 and the denial of loss recognition on sales be-
tween related parties'8 do not provide for option attribution. Since
the omission of an attribution requirement from these provisions
permits some abusive transactions to escape appropriate tax treat-
ment, needed attribution rules are suggested.
I. No ATTRIBUTION TO THE OPTIONHOLDER REQUIRED
A. Corporate Organization and Reorganization
The concept of control makes stock ownership pertinent to the
corporate organization and reorganization sections of the Code.'9
Certain transactions are nontaxable only if specified parties are "in
control" at the conclusion of the transaction. For example, the
transfer of property to a corporation in return for the stock or securi-
ties of that corporation is a nontaxable event if after the exchange
those who transferred the property are in control of the corpora-
tion.20 Control is statutorily defined as the ownership of at least 80%
of the total combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to
vote and at least 80% of the total number of shares of all other
classes of stock.2'
Although the Code is silent on the question, the courts have
established a general rule that, for the corporate organization and
reorganization provisions, an optionholder does not own the stock
underlying his option. 22 The courts reason that an optionholder's
,1 I.R.C. § 544.
, I.R C. § 302.
" I.R.C. § 1563.
, I.R.C. § 4943.
, I.R.C. § 267.
" I.R.C. §§ 351, 368.
2* I.R.C. § 351(a). Control is also critical to qualifying under the reorganization provi-
sions of §§ 368(a)(1)(B), (D).
21 I.R.C. § 368(c).
2 Helvering v. Southwest Consol. Corp., 315 U.S. 194 (1941); Commissioner v. National
Bellas Hess, Inc., 200 F.2d 415 (8th Cir. 1955); Herman Berghash, 43 T.C. 743 (1965), aff'd,
361 F.2d 257 (2d Cir. 1966); American Wire Fabrics, 16 T.C. 607 (1951); Robert J. Harder,
17 T.C.M. (CCH) 494 (1958). But cf. Barker v. United States, 200 F.2d 223 (9th Cir. 1952)
(option grantor not treated as controlling underlying shares because option agreement de-
prived grantor of unrestricted control of stock).
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rights differ significantly from those of a shareholder. An option-
holder has no vote and thus no direct voice in the corporation's
affairs, has no right to receive dividends or otherwise share in the
corporation's earnings, and would receive nothing if the corporation
were to liquidate. The bundle of rights possessed by the option-
holder is thus unlikely to give him the requisite control over the
newly formed or reorganized corporation.13 Furthermore, the likeli-
hood that the optionholder will acquire the rights of a shareholder
and thus acquire control is uncertain. The optionholder may have
to supply additional consideration or act within a specified time and
may choose not to exercise the option.
The general rule of nonattribution is consistent with the control
criterion of the corporate organization and reorganization provi-
sions. 4 Although the rule can be abused, the courts have invoked
the step-transaction doctrines to remedy such abuses, thereby elim-
inating the need to modify the general rule of nonattribution to
prevent tax avoidance schemes. Under the step-transaction doc-
trine, the separate steps of a transaction are viewed as an integrated
whole to determine the tax consequences. The doctrine's operation
is illustrated in Ericsson Screw Machine Products Co. 2 16 In this case,
A corporation and B corporation contributed assets to C corporation
in return for all of C's stock. A and B hoped that the transaction
would qualify as a tax-free reorganization, 2 in order to preserve the
high basis of B's assets.2s As part of the plan, B granted an option
to A to purchase the C stock received by B. A exercised the option
2 The most significant similarity between an optionholder and a stockholder is that the
value of their holdings is a direct function of the price of the stock.
24 See text and notes at notes 30-32 infra.
21 The essence of the step-transaction doctrine is that an integrated transaction may not
be broken into independent steps or, conversely, that the separate steps must be taken
together in determining the tax consequences. See King Enterprises, Inc. v. United States,
418 F.2d 511 (Ct. Cl. 1969), citing B. BrrriTK & J. EUSTIcE, FaEFaaL INcoME TAXAFoN OF
CORPORA1oNS AND SHMAEHOLDERS § 1.05 (2d ed. 1966); Mintz & Plumb, Step Transactions
in Corporate Reorganizations, 12 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX. 247 (1954); Hobbett, Step Trans-
action Doctrine and Its Effect on Corporate Transactions, 19 TUL. TAx INST. 102 (1970).
28 14 T.C. 757 (1950).
2 A reorganization that is merely a business readjustment and results in no substantial
change in the rights and relations of the interested parties to one another or the assets
involved is not a taxable event. See text and notes at notes 30-31 infra.
The parties in Ericsson were trying to satisfy Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 247, §
112(g)(1)(a), 53 Stat. 47 (now I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(D)), which provided that a transfer by a
corporation of all or part of its assets to another corporation is a reorganization and therefore
not a taxable event if immediately after the transfer the transferor or its shareholders, or both,
are in control of the transferee corporation.
2 The basis of property transferred pursuant to a tax-free reorganization is generally
carried over from the transferor to the transferee. I.R.C. § 362(b).
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six months after the formation of C, paying the fair market value
of the assets contributed by B. A thus became the sole shareholder
of C. The Tax Court applied step-transaction analysis to these facts
and held that-A should be treated as owning the stock underlying
its option.
The term of the option which set the exercise price at the fair
market value of the assets contributed by B was a particularly sus-
picious indication that the substance of the transactions was a sale
of B's assets to C rather than a corporate reorganization. The parties
never intended B to keep the C stock; B's ownership was merely a
transitory step in the overall plan. The option served as the means
for ostensibly fulfilling the statutory requirements while allowing A
to obtain full control of C. The court treated the transaction in
accordance with its economic substance, finding that the assets had
a basis to C equal to the amount paid for them, i.e., their fair market
value.29
The general rule of nonattribution to an optionholder, in combi-
nation with step-transaction analysis, results in favorable treatment
under the corporate organization and reorganization provisions for
those transactions that Congress intended to benefit. The provisions
are designed to allow business readjustments to take place without
In some instances, the goal of the parties may be to avoid the corporate organization
or reorganization provision, where, for example, there is no gain to recognize and the parties
want a stepped-up basis for the assets. American Bantam Car Co., 11 T.C. 397 (1948), aff'd,
177 F.2d 513 (3d Cir. 1948). In such situations, options could be used to prevent the transac-
tion from being classified as a tax-free corporate organization. A corporate organization could
avoid I.R.C. § 351 if the transferor did not own 80% of the corporation's stock after the
transfer. The transferor could receive 79% of the newly organized corporation's stock, the
remaining 21% going to a third party (X) who grants an option on the stock to the transferor.
However, since X did not contribute assets to the newly formed corporation, his receipt of
the 21% interest may, pursuant to Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1(b)(1) (1955), subject the transferor
to gift tax liability because he has in effect made a gift toX of the 21% interest. An alternative
characterization is that the transferor is compensating X by giving him the 21% interest.
Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1(b)(1) (1955) also states that under such circumstances X would recog-
nize income on the receipt of the stock. This treatment is a significant disincentive to the
use of options to avoid I.R.C. § 351. Moreover, the subsequent exercise of the option, which
is inevitable if the transferor has not made a gift or given the stock as compensation to X,
provides appropriate facts for applying the step-transaction doctrine.
Options could be used to avoid satisfying the 80% control requirement for nontaxable
reorganizations in the same manner as discussed for corporate organizations. I.R.C. § 368 has
no equivalent to Tress. Reg. § 1.351-1(b)(1) (1955), but the gift or compensation characteriza-
tion seems equally applicable. The principal method for preventing the misuse of options to
avoid reorganization treatment is step-transaction analysis. The courts are as willing to apply
step-transaction analysis to efforts to avoid reorganization treatment as they are to attempts
to qualify as a reorganization. See Turner Constr. Co. v. United States, 364 F.2d 525 (2d Cir.
1966); AFC-Brill Motors Co. v. Commissioner, 189 F.2d 704 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S.
886 (1951).
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incurring a tax,3 on the theory that gain or loss should not be recog-
nized on changes of corporate form involving no substantial change
in the relationships of the interested parties to one another or in the
rights to the assets involved.3 1 Any corporate organization or reorg-
anization will, however, cause some change in the rights and rela-
tions of the parties. For example, a group of individuals contributes
property to a corporation and receives in return all the corporation's
stock. Each member of the group exchanges control over his individ-
ual assets for a proportionate interest in the whole of the corpora-
tion's assets. As a stockholder, the transferor cannot deal with the
corporation's assets in the same manner as when he owned them
directly. Nevertheless, Congress decided that the change involved
in those transactions that satisfy the corporate organization and
reorganization provisions is not substantial enough to treat the
transaction as a taxable event.
The changes in the parties' rights and relationships are much
more substantial when options are used. The individual who con-
tributes property to a corporation in return for a stock option ac-
quires no definite interest in the corporation's assets, but only the
right to purchase stock that would in turn give him the rights of a
shareholder. Such an individual has significantly changed his rights
to the assets involved. This substantial change makes it inappro-
priate to include the stock underlying the option as part of the 80%
stock ownership necessary to have control. The courts, perceiving
the different rights of a shareholder and an optionholder and recog-
nizing Congress's intent to exempt only business readjustments
from taxation, have not treated optionholders as owning the stock
underlying their option. 2 This rule may allow taxpayers, such as the
parties in Ericsson, to use options to arrange a transaction that is
not a business readjustment yet fits within the express language of
the corporate organization and reorganization sections, but the
step-transaction doctrine prevents the general rule on options from
being misused. The courts have thus developed a general rule con-
H.R. REP. No. 350, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. (1921), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. pt.2, at 168,
175; S. REP. No. 276, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. (1921), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. pt.2, at 181, 188;
H.R. REP. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. pt.2, at 241, 151.
The law was a reaction against a series of Supreme Court decisions that treated even the
slightest business adjustment as a taxable event. Marr v. United States, 268 U.S. 536 (1925);
Cullinan v. Walker, 262 U.S. 134 (1923); United States v. Phellis, 257 U.S. 156 (1921);
Rockefeller v. United States, 257 U.S. 176 (1921).
11 B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND
SHAREHOLDERS § 14.01 (3d ed. 1971).
32 See note 22 supra.
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sistent with Congress's intent, while avoiding the rule in those situa-
tions where it leads to abuse.
B. Subchaper S Corporations
Subchapter S of the Internal Revenue Code" allows sharehold-
ers of eligible corporations to choose to be taxed as though the
corporation was a partnership.34 Stock ownership is relevant to Sub-
chapter S in two ways. To be eligible for treatment under the provi-
sions, a corporation generally cannot have more than ten sharehold-
ers,35 and all shareholders must consent to Subchaper S treatment.3 1
The Subchaper S regulations define a shareholder as one who
must include in his gross income dividends distributed with respect
to the corporation's stock.37 An optionholder does not include in
gross income dividends on the stock underlying his option" and
should not be regarded as a shareholder for the purposes of Sub-
chaper S. The Internal Revenue Service implicitly accepted this
conclusion in ruling that the issuance of options will not affect a
corporation's eligibility for Subchapter S treatment. 9 Not attribut-
ing the underlying stock to the optionholder is consistent with the
general differences between an optionholder's and a shareholder's
rights and with the specific purposes of Subchapter S.14
Subchap'ter S was enacted to enable taxpayers to choose among
different forms of business organization without having to take the
different tax consequences into account.4' This purpose is not served
-' I.R.C. § 1371-1379.
BrrrKER & EUSTICE, supra note 31, § 6.01. Subchapter S provides that a corporation's
income and losses are not taxed to the corporation but are passed through to the shareholders.
I.R.C. §§ 1373-1374.
11 I.R.C. § 1351(a)(1). The Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 902(a)(2), 90
Stat. 1608, modified the ten shareholder rule by allowing certain qualified corporations to
have fifteen shareholders if the corporation has been a Subchapter S corporation for five
consecutive years or if the increase in the number of shareholders is due to the acquisition of
stock through inheritance. I.R.C. § 1371(e). For an explanation of the changes to the ten
shareholder requirement, see Allsworth, Subchapter S Corporations and The Tax Reform Act
of 1976, PRAc. LAW., Dec. 1976, at 37.
3 I.R.C. § 1372(a).
31 Treas. Reg. § 1.1371-1(d)(1) (1959).
Rev. Rul. 234, 1958-1 C.B. 279.
Rev. Rul. 269, 1967-2 C.B. 298.
40 By focusing on those parties who have beneficial ownership of stock, this analysis is
consistent with the approach taken by the courts in deciding who is a shareholder for the
purposes of Subchapter S. See, e.g., Kean v. Commissioner, 469 F.2d 1183 (9th Cir. 1972);
Pacific Coast Music Jobbers, Inc. v. Commissioner, 457 F.2d 1165 (5th Cir. 1972); Alfred
Hoffman, 47 T.C. 218 (1966), afl'd per curiam, 391 F.2d 930 (5th Cir. 1968); Wilson v.
Commissioner, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 463 (1975).
11 S. REP. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958), reprinted in 1958-3 C.B. 922, 953.
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by requiring optionholders to consent to Subchaper S treatment,
since the benefits of such treatment depend upon the relative tax
brackets of the corporation and the shareholders. The optionholder,
who is taxed on neither the dividends nor the income passed through
under Subchapter S, has no significant interest in how the corpora-
tion's income is taxed. Accordingly, his consent should not be re-
quired.4 2
Exempting optionholders from the determination of the num-
ber of shareholders can, however, lead to abuses of Subchapter S.
Options can be used to avoid the ten-shareholder limit on a corpora-
tion's eligibility. For example, if a corporation has eleven sharehold-
ers, the eleventh could sell his stock to the tenth shareholder and
receive a repurchase option on the shares. 3 But such abuses are not
of sufficient likelihood or magnitude to warrant treating all option-
holders as shareholders for determining Subchapter S eligibility.
Taxpayers are unlikely to engage in abusive option arrangements
because the consequence of stock ownership under Subchapter S is
that income and losses are passed through to the shareholders.44 If
the tenth shareholder owns the eleventh stockholder's shares, he will
pay the tax on the income attributable to the ownership interest in
those shares. This burden is a strong disincentive for such transac-
tions.4 5 Conversely, if the corporation is in a loss position, share-
holder eleven would like those losses passed through to him rather
than allowing shareholder ten to receive the benefit. Treating op-
tionsholders as not owning the underlying stock thus seems appro-
priate in light of the purposes of Subchaper S and the limited possi-
bilities for abuse.
11 This reasoning was applied in Alfred Hoffman, 47 T.C. 218 (1966), aff'd per curiam,
391 F.2d 930 (5th Cir. 1968), where the court held that a creditor for whom stock was held in
escrow as security for a debt was not a shareholder and that his consent to the Subchapter S
election was therefore not needed.
4 If the option is exercised shortly after the transfer, suggesting that the parties intended
to qualify only temporarily as a Subchapter S corporation, the step-transaction doctrine may
be invoked. In addition, if the terms of the option are nominal, the courts may regard the
grantor as a nominee and ignore the sale. For the rule that nominees are to be ignored in the
Subchapter S context, see Wilson v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 463 (1975); Rev. Rul.
615, 1970-2 C.B. 169. For the rule that the grantor of an option with a nominal price is merely
a nominee and not the beneficial owner, see Rev. Rul. 469, 1970-2 C.B. 179; Rev. Rul. 458,
1955-2 C.B. 579.
" I.R.C. §§ 1373-1374.
Is Two parties might attempt to solve this problem by making the exercise price adjusta-
ble so that it would be increased by the amount of tax the grantor had to pay on the income
attributed to him from the shares subject to the option. However, such an arrangement would
so complicate the transaction that the parties are unlikely to resort to it. Moreover, an
adjustable exercise price would justify application of the step-transaction doctrine. In Erics-
son Screw Machine Products Co., 14 T.C. 757 (1950), a suspicious exercise price was one of
the grounds on which the court rested its step-transaction analysis.
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C. Consolidated Returns
Before two corporations may file a consolidated income tax
return, one must own stock with at least 80% of the voting power of
all classes of stock and at least 80% of each class of nonvoting stock
of the other corporation." For the purpose of satisfying the 80%
ownership tests, an optionholder is treated as not owning the stock
underlying his option." For example, the Service allows a parent
corporation that owns 80% of a subsidiary corporation's stock to
include the subsidiary in a consolidated return even though suffi-
cient options are outstanding to dilute the parent's ownership to
below 80% if the options were exercised. 4" Again, this approach is
based on the recognition that an unexercised option does not bestow
any of the rights or liabilities of stockholders upon the optionhold-
ers.
The primary purpose of the consolidated return provisions is to
allow a group of corporations comprising an economic unit to be
taxed as unit. 9 Nonattribution from stock options is appropriate in
light of this purpose. A corporation holding an option to acquire
stock is in a very different position than a corporation owning the
stock. The corporate optionholder (X) is not likely to shift income,
deductions, or credits from itself to the corporation (Y) whose stock
underlies the option. Because X has no assurance that it will receive
the benefits of the gains resulting from the shifting of income, X is
more likely to deal with Y at arm's length. Corporations dealing
with each other at arm's length will each pursue their own self-
interest and should not be taxed as if they were a single economic
unit.
Moreover, the possibilities for abusing this rule of nonattribu-
tion are slight. The consolidated return provisions are permissive;
a parent corporation satisfying the 80% ownership test is not re-
quired to file consolidated returns. No incentive exists to manipu-
late options to avoid the 80% test. Abuse could result, however, if
A corporation possessed a tax benefit, such as a net operating loss,
that it could not use but that B corporation could use. The parties
might find it advantageous for B to acquire A stock in order to file
4, I.R.C. §§ 1501, 1504(a).
Moore v. McGrawl, 63 F.2d 593 (5th Cir. 1933); Thomas Bayard, 38 B.T.A. 778, 793
(1938); Island Petroleum Co., 17 B.T.A. 1 (1929), af'd, 57 F.2d 992 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
287 U.S. 646 (1932); Bay State Sec. Co., 3 B.T.A. 43 (1925).
Rev. Rul. 251, 1964-2 C.B. 338.
" F. PEt, CONSOLmATED TAX REruRNs 33 (1973); S. REP. No. 617, 65th Cong., 3d Sess.
(1918), 1939-1 pt. 2 C.B. 117, 123.
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consolidated returns if B could give the A shareholders an option to
repurchase with the intent that the option be exercised once the tax
benefit is used. 0 Option attribution is not necessary to remedy this
abuse. Instead, section 269, giving the government authority to dis-
allow a deduction or credit when the principal purpose of an acquisi-
tion is to obtain a deduction or credit to which the taxpayer is
otherwise not entitled, should be sufficient to handle abusive trans-
actions. 51 Furthermore, a transfer of stock with an option granted to
the transferor, followed by an exercise of the option, invites the
application of step-transaction analysis. Finally, if the tax benefit
is a net operating loss, section 382 will come into play and disallow
all or part of the loss.52 With the IRS and the courts armed with
sections 269 and 382 and the step-transaction doctrine, the possibili-
ties for abuse do not seem significant enough to require a change in
the general rule.
II. ExcEssvE ATTRiBuTON TO THE OPTIONHOLDER
A. Personal Holding Company
The first statutory requirement that an optionholder should be
treated as owning the stock underlying the option appeared in 1937
as an amendment to the personal holding company provisions. 3
These provisions had been adopted in 1934 to prevent a relatively
simple tax avoidance scheme: an individual forms a corporation and
exchanges his personal holdings in stocks, bonds, or other income-
producing property for the corporation's stock; the income from
these properties is taxed to the corporation, but the individual pays
no tax if the income is not distributed. 4 The personal holding com-
pany resulted in substantial tax savings for an individual whose
marginal tax rate was higher than the corporate rate.55 The 1934
5 The exercise price would be set to compensate the A shareholders for the tax benefit
used by B.
51 Typical applications of I.R.C. § 269 are PEPI, Inc. v. Commissioner, 448 F.2d 141 (2d
Cir. 1971); Scroll, Inc. v. Commissioner, 447 F.2d 612 (5th Cir. 1971); Swiss Colony, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 428 F.2d 49 (7th Cir. 1970).
12 I.R.C. § 382, as amended by the Tax Reform Act of 1976, contains a detailed set of
rules for disallowing net operating loss carryovers of corporations acquired by purchase or
reorganization. For an explanation of the significant changes made to I.R.C. § 382 by the 1976
Act, see Libin, Recent Developments in Corporate Organizations and Reorganizations-
Including a New Look for Sec. 382, 54 TAxEs 876 (1976).
0 Revenue Act of 1937, ch. 815, § 354(a)(3), 50 Stat. 815 (codified as I.R.C. § 544(a)(3)).
31 One of the government's weapons for preventing this scheme, a penalty tax on unrea-
sonable accumulations of income, functioned poorly because of the difficulty of proving that
a holding company's accumulated income was unreasonable.
H.R. REP. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. pt. 2, at 554,
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provisions removed the advantage from this scheme by imposing a
surtax on the undistributed income of companies that fall within
the statutory definition of a personal holding company."
One of the statutory tests for a personal holding company is
that five or fewer individuals own more than 50% of the value of the
stock.5 7 The first personal holding company provisions included
rules governing attribution of ownership 8 that were designed to give
meaning to the statutory phrase "owned directly or indirectly, by
or for not more than five individuals." The rules provided that, for
purposes of the 50% ownership test, an individual constructively
owns the stock owned by various members of his family and by a
corporation, partnership, estate, or trust, in proportion to his inter-
est therein."
These constructive ownership rules did not prevent taxpayers
from easily avoiding the 50% ownership test through the use of
options." For example, five shareholders owning shares representing
51% of the value of the company would transfer 2% of the value of
the shares to a friendly outside party, subject to an option to repur-
chase the shares. Congress, viewing such shareholders as "for all
practical purposes in the same situation as if they owned 51 per cent
in value of the stock,""1 expanded the definition of constructive
stock ownership to treat the holder of an option to acquire stock as
owning the stock underlying the option.12
This provision has the advantage of providing a clear and sim-
ple test and has consequently engendered little litigation.8 3 How-
51 I.R.C. § 542 defines a personal holding company in terms of the nature of its income
and the concentration of the ownership of its stock.
57 I.R.C. § 542(a)(2). The test requiring that more than 50% of the value of the stock be
owned by five or fewer shareholders will hereafter be referred to as the 50% ownership test.
These constructive ownership rules are now part of I.R.C. § 544. These rules are also
used for the foreign personal holding company provisions in I.R.C. § 551-558. Because the
analysis of stock ownership for personal holding companies is equally applicable to foreign
personal holding companies, they are not discussed separately.
The constructive ownership rules operate only where their effect is to make the entity a
personal holding company. Thus an actual owner's interest is not reduced if another party
constructively owns the stock. See I.R.C. § 544(a)(4)(A).
11 Attribution from corporations, partnerships, estates, or trusts will hereafter be referred
to as "interested entity attribution."
I G0 This problem is the opposite of that found in Subchaper S. There the taxpayer's goal
is to have the number of shareholders fall below the statutory ceiling; here the taxpayer's goal
is to have the number of shareholders exceed the statutory floor.
11 H.R. REp. No. 1546, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. pt. 2, at
704, 709.
62 I.R.C. § 544(a)(3). I.R.C. § 555(a)(3) is the equivalent rule under the foreign personal
holding company provisions.
The only reported cases involving options under the personal holding company provi-
sions are Estate of Nellie S. Miller, 43 T.C. 760 (1965), and Foremeno Ltd., 3 T.C.M. (CCH)
981 (1944).
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ever, the section is broader than the tax-avoidance abuses it seeks
to remedy; unwary persons can unintentionally become entangled
in the personal holding company provisions.64 An example illus-
trates this overbreadth. A corporation with twenty shareholders ar-
ranges for its officers, who are already shareholders, to have options
to purchase some of the stock of the other shareholders. The exercise
price is set to reward the officers if the company prospers. If the
officers number five or less and their current stock holdings added
to their optioned shares exceed 50% of the value of the corporation's
stock, the corporation meets the stock ownership test for personal
holding companies and is subject to the possibility of taxation under
the provisions despite the absence of any tax avoidance motive."
An appropriate rule for attributing stock ownership to option-
holders under the personal holding company provisions must satisfy
several criteria. Because options do provide a means to avoid the
provisions, a prophylactic rule is required. The rule should be broad
enough to prevent such avoidance, yet sufficiently narrow so as not
to affect option arrangements not intended to avoid the tax on per-
sonal holding companies.
Viewed from this perspective, the current option attribution
rules are more difficult to justify than the family and interested
entity (corporation, partnership, trust, or estate) attribution rules.
An individual indirectly benefits from the stock owned by his family
or an entity in which he has an interest, and it is reasonable to
assume that he controls such stock. The Code appropriately treats
one benefiting from stock and having control over it as its owner.
The presumptions of control and indirect benefits that apply to
family and interested entity situations are not directly transferable
to options, however. A rule attributing ownership from options must
distinguish between situations in which the optionholder should be
presumed to control and derive benefits from the underlying stock
and situations in which no such presumption* arises." Option attri-
bution is justified only in the former situation, where the grantor of
" This possibility is reduced by the fact that stock ownership is not the only test for
personal holding company status. An income test requirement, I.R.C. § 542(a)(1), must also
be satisfied before the personal holding company tax is imposed. Stockholder status is rele-
vant for the income test provisions as well. See I.R.C. § 544(a)(4).
" Although this situation might be avoided by appropriate planning, the burden for tax
planning by unsuspecting individuals is unnecessary to the statutory purpose. A better ap-
proach is to redraft the statute to narrow the attribution rule.
" The rights of an optionholder are generally not by themselves sufficient to create a
presumption of control over or benefit from the grantor's stock. See text and notes at notes
22-23 supra.
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the option can be said to be subordinate to the optionholder.67 If the
grantor acquired the stock in a transaction initiated by the option-
holder, the grantor's independence is questionable. Conversely, if
the optionholder was not the moving party in the transaction, the
grantor will presumably vote the stock according to his own inter-
ests rather than at the direction of the optionholder, and the option-
holder is unlikely to benefit from the stock.
The following rules are suggested to replace the option attribu-
tion rules currently employed in the personal holding company pro-
visions. The rules are an attempt to require option attribution only
in situations in which there is a basis for presuming that the option-
holder controls the grantor and thus the grantor's stock.
An optionholder will not be regarded as owning the stock
underlying his option unless:
(Rule 1) The grantor of the option acquired either the
stock subject to the option or the funds to acquire the
stock subject to the option directly or indirectly from the
optionholder, a member of the optionholder's family," or
an interested entity;69 or
(Rule 2) The grantor of the option received his stock
Options granted by various family members or by an interested entity are of no con-
cern here because the stock on which the option was granted could be attributed to the
optionholder through existing family or entity attribution rules. However, current law pro-
vides that in a choice betweeri applying the family attribution and the option attribution
rules, the option rules will govern. I.R.C. § 544(a) (6). This provision is intended to limit the
bar on double family-partnership attribution imposed by I.R.C. § 544(a)(5). If the option
rules did not override, for example, the stock underlying an option granted to a wife by her
brother would not be attributed to her husband because of the bar on double use of the family-
partnership attribution rules.
The bar on double family-partnership attribution is based on Congress's belief that the
link between the actual owner and the one made a constructive owner through double attribu-
tion is indirect and attenuated. However, since Congress views option ownership in this
context as equivalent to actual ownership, the second link is not tenuous and reattribution
is therefore proper. See H.R. REP. No. 1546, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937), reprinted in 1939-1
C.B. pt. 2, at 704, 709.
"Family" is a technical term defined differently from section to section. See Reilly,
supra note 5; Ricketts, An Outline of The Four Major Attribution Rules; How They Operate,
26 J. TAx 26 (1967). For the purpose of applying Rule 1 to the personal holding company
provisions, family is to be defined as provided by the constructive ownership rules of the
personal holding company provisions. I.R.C. § 544(a) (2) defines family as including brothers
and sisters (whether whole or half blood), spouse, ancestors, and lineal descendants. When
Rule 1 is applied to other provisions, the definition of family will be the one used for that
provision.
63 The definition of interested entity also varies throughout the Code. The interested
entities included within the constructive ownership rules of the personal holding company
provisions are corporations, partnerships, estates, and trusts. When Rule 1 is applied in other
contexts, interested entity will be defined in accord with the definition used in that context.
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directly or indirectly from the issuing corporation without
supplying consideration equal to the fair market value of
the stock.7
Rule 1 will cover most situations in which the optionholder can
justifiably be presumed to control the grantor. For example, the rule
would preclude avoidance of the personal holding company provi-
sions by arrangements in which an optionholder receives stock from
the issuing corporation and sells it to the grantor, who then grants
an option back to the seller. The language "directly or indirectly"
is intended to invite the courts to apply step-transaction analysis
and to look to beneficial ownership in order to strike down any
arrangement that manipulates stock ownership to avoid the rule's
express language. The "funds" language is designed to cover situa-
tions in which an optionholder or one acting on his behalf transfers
to the grantor the funds to acquire the stock rather than the stock
itself. Such a transfer does not diminish the presumption that the
optionholder controls the grantor.
The reach of Rule 2 is narrower. It operates to prevent the
optionholder from directing the corporation to give stock to the
grantor, then arranging for the grantor to give him an option on the
stock. If the grantor provides bona fide consideration, he will have
an interest in the corporation like any other shareholder and is not
likely to be controlled by the optionholder. 71
By focusing on the means by which the grantor acquired his
stock, the proposed rules make it possible to isolate those options
that are being used to avoid the personal holding company tax.72
7 Another rule might be added, based on a presumption of control arising out of a certain
relationship between the grantor and the grantee of an option. For example, an em-
ployer/grantee could be presumed to control the stock of an employee/grantor. This presump-
tion is used in I.R.C. § 1563. See note 101 infra. Such a rule is unnecessary. If the option is
not caught by Rules 1 and 2, it is probably not being used to avoid statutory ownership tests.
Furthermore, in the employment relationship, the grantee is not likely to benefit from stock
held by an employee to the same degree as from stock attributed to him by the other attribu-
tion rules.
71 The presence of adequate consideration is not relevant under Rule 1 because the direct
sale of stock from the grantee to the optionholder raises the presumption that the option is
being used to avoid the personal holding company tax.
72 Rules 1 and 2 differ greatly from the ABA proposal. See ABA Proposed Attribution
Rules, supra note 4. The ABA proposal focuses on the imminence of the exercise of the option,
and is concerned with whether the optionholder has a "significant present interest in the stock
in question." Id. at 934. The proposal looks to certain objective criteria, such as the exercise
date and price to determine whether a present interest exists. By focusing on the uncertainty
of exercise, the ABA proposal fails to consider the reason for option attribution. As demon-
strated by the discussion of those provisions where there is no option attribution, see text and
notes at notes 19-45 supra, an optionholder is not considered to have a present interest in
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Attribution rules are necessary to meet the strong incentive to avoid
the punitive personal holding company provisions and the relative
ease with which options can be used to evade the 50% ownership
test. These factors, not present in the nonpunitive provisions pre-
viously examined, such as Subchaper S,73 warrant a departure from
the rule that an optionholder is not to be treated as a shareholder.7 4
The suggested rules75 are preferable to the current provision in that
they reach situations where abuse is likely but do not affect option
transactions not motivated by a desire to avoid the personal holding
company provisions .7
B. Section 318 and Stock Redemptions
Section 31877 provides a set of attribution rules that operates
only in conjunction with other specified sections of the Code.7" Sec-
tion 318's option attribution rule79 is identical to the rule governing
the personal holding company provisions" in treating the option-
holder as the owner of the underlying stock. The purpose of section
318 is to provide certainty in determining stock ownership for corpo-
rate distributions and adjustments. Presumably, 2 Congress per-
ceived possibilities for abuse similar to those that prompted the
option attribution rule for personal holding companies; a party
the underlying stock. Option attribution does not imply that the rights of an optionholder
are equivalent to those of an actual stockholder. Rather, option attribution is imposed to
prevent taxpayers from using options to avoid the consequences attaching to stock ownership.
By focusing on the certainty of exercise and ignoring the reason for option attribution, the
ABA proposal will not result in option attribution in those situations where it is appropriate.
13 See text and notes at notes 33-45 supra.
11 See text and notes at notes 19-45 supra.
11 Rules 1 and 2 are not intended to affect I.R.C. § 544(a)(6). For a discussion of that
section, see note 67 supra. Because the rules attribute stock ownership where the optionholder
has significant control over the underlying stock, the first link in a double attribution chain
remains solid. Since the first link of the attribution treats option ownership as equivalent to
actual ownership, it is not objectionable to reattribute such stock.
11 The stock ownership rules of I.R.C. § 544 are also used in I.R.C. § 341(d) and Treas.
Reg. § 1.1551-1(1)(e)(2) (1955).
77 I.R.C. § 318.
11 I.R.C. § 318's rules are used in conjunction with I.R.C. §§ 302, 304, 306(b)(1)(A),
334(b)(3)(c), 382(a)(3), 856(d), 958(b), 1239, 6038(d)(1).
11 I.R.C. § 318(a)(4).
91 See text and notes at notes 53-65 supra.
" H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1959), reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. Naws 4025, 4234.
12 Unfortunately, the Senate, which added the option attribution provision to the House
bill during the 1954 revisions of the Internal Revenue Code, did not explain its action. S. REP.
No. 1662, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954), reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. N.ws 4621,
4890-92.
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could avoid the tax consequences of stock ownership by using op-
tions to disperse his holdings.
The success of the section 318 option attribution rule can be
analyzed by examining the rule as applied to the stock redemption
provisions," one of the principal areas in which section 318 operates.
To qualify for the favorable tax treatment provided by section 302,1"
a stockholder whose shares are redeemed must incur a reduction in
his proportionate interest in the corporation. This requirement re-
duces the risk that a stock redemption will provide a means to
obtain capital gain treatment for a distribution that is in fact a
dividend.85 Congress formulated the redemption provisions to pro-
vide precise rules for determining whether a redemption is to be
taxed as a dividend or at capital gains rates. 6 The gain on a redemp-
tion is to be taxed at capital gains rates if the redemption is substan-
tially disproportionate"7 or if the shareholder completely terminates
his interest in the corporation."
The determination whether a redemption is substantially dis-
proportionate or results in a complete termination turns on stock
ownership, both actual and constructive. The option attribution
rule operates with the complete termination provision to deny capi-
tal gain treatment to a shareholder who retains any options after the
redemption.8 9 In combination with the "substantially dispropor-
tionate" provision, the option attribution rule can deny a share-
holder capital gain treatment if the stocks underlying a retained
93 I.R.C. § 302, 304, 306.
" I.R.C. § 302. Other redemptions covered by special statutory provisions are redemp-
tions through the use of related corporations, I.R.C. § 304, and redemptions of § 306 stock.
I.R.C. § 306. The analysis used for § 302 redemptions applies to § 304 or § 306 redemptions
as well.
" ,For fuller explanation of how stock redemptions can be abused, see Wolfberg, Stock
Redemptions under Section 302 of the 1954 Code, 48 TAxEs 27, 28 (1970).
" H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954), reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 4025, 4234.
9 I.R.C. § 302(b)(2). For a definition of "substantially disproportionate," see note 90
infra.
u I.R.C. § 302(b)(3). A third type of redemption entitled to capital gain treatment is a
redemption which, in the language of I.R.C. § 302(b)(1), "is not essentially equivalent to a
dividend." The constructive ownership rules of I.R.C. § 318, although not directly used for
an I.R.C. § 302(b)(1) redemption, are to be considered in evaluating the nature of the redemp-
tion. Treas. Reg. § 1.302-2(b) (1955); see United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301 (1970); Haft
Trust v. Commissioner, 510 F.2d 43, 46 (lst Cir. 1975).
0 In order to qualify under the complete termination provision, the taxpayer may not
directly or constructively own any stock after the redemption. The family attribution rules
are not applied if the taxpayer has no interest in the corporation after the redemption, does
not acquire any subsequent interest within ten years of the redemption, and files the pre-
scribed forms. I.R.C. § 302(c)(2). However, the taxpayer cannot avoid the option attribution
rules of I.R.C. § 318.
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option cause him to fail the percentage tests defining "substantially
disproportionate.""
Section 318's option attribution rule is overbroad. As with the
rules governing personal holding companies, unwary optionholders
can accidentally and unnecessarily be subjected to the tax conse-
quences of attributed ownership. For example, a shareholder-officer
who receives stock options as part of his compensation package
could fail the percentage tests for a substantially disproportionate
redemption even though the granting of these options is in no Way
related to the redemption. Although some option attribution is nec-
essary to prevent the abuse of stock redemptions, attribution should
be confined to the optionholder who benefits from and is able to
control the voting of the underlying stock. The principal abuses can
be prevented by applying Rules 1 and 2 as formulated in the discus-
sion of the personal holding company provisions.
An additional problem presented by stock redemptions creates
the need for a third attribution rule. Section 302 requires a party to
terminate part or all of his interest in a corporation in order to
qualify for a more favorable tax treatment of the gain from the
redemption. When a corporation redeems the shares of a stock-
holder who retains an option and this optionholder subsequently
exercises it, at least an appearance of a continuing interest in the
corporation is present. The party seemingly has not reduced his
interest to the extent of the shares received upon that exercise of the
option. A third rule resolves this problem:
(Rule 3) An optionholder will be treated as owning the stock
underlying the option if the option is exercised within five years
after the date of redemption.1
,0 A taxpayer must meet three tests to qualify under the substantially disproportionate
redemption provision. First, I.R.C. § 302(b)(2)(B) requires that after the redemption the
shareholder must own less than 50% of the total combined voting power of all classes of
outstanding stock entitled to vote. Second, I.R.C. § 302(b)(2)(C) requires that the share-
holder's percentage of outstanding voting stock immediately after the redemption must be
less than 80% of his ownership of such stock before the redemption. Finally, I.R.C. §
302(b)(2)(C) requires that the shareholder's percentage of outstanding common stock
(whether voting or nonvoting) after the redemption be less than 80% of his ownership before
the redemption.
" Procedurally, this rule operates like the ten-year bar on stock acquisitions under the
provisions allowing a waiver of family attribution rules in complete termination redemptions.
I.R.C. § 302(c)(2)(A)(ii). See note 89 supra. Applied in the present context, I.R.C. §
302(c) (2)(A)(iii) would require the optionholder whose shares are redeemed to file a statement
with the Commissioner agreeing to notify the Commissioner if any options are exercised
within the proscribed time period, and to keep records of the transaction. The statute of
limitations would be extended so that if the options are exercised within five years, an
adjustment could be made to the tax due for the year of the redemption.
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This rule in effect applies the step-transaction doctrine to op-
tions exercised subsequent to redemptions. The rule is unnecessary
for the personal holding company provisions, which require annual
determinations of a corporation's status.2 By contrast, a stock re-
demption is a single, isolated transaction. The transaction-oriented
redemption provisions may tempt a party to manipulate his stock
ownership at the time of the transaction to obtain more favorable
tax treatment if he is able to return to the status quo after the
transaction is complete. Personal holding companies do not present
the same incentive for manipulation because it is impractical to
set up an artificial situation year after year. 3 Rule 3 operates to
prevent such temporary manipulations. If the shareholder is re-
quired to maintain the ownership arrangements existing at the time
of the transaction for five years, the incentive for manipulation is
greatly reduced. 4 The three rules together eliminate the opportuni-
ties for using options to abuse the transaction-oriented stock re-
demption provisions, while avoiding the broad sweep of the current
rules.
C. Section 1563 and Multiple Corporations
Sections 1561 and 1563 were enacted to limit the tax advan-
tages available to a group of shareholders who split their one corpo-
ration into several. Because certain tax benefits are extended on a
per corporation basis, 5 without these sections shareholders could
divide their business into several corporations to obtain multiple
benefits. 6 Section 1561 removes this advantage of multiple corpora-
tions where the same shareholders own the stock by denying multi-
ple benefits for "controlled corporations."97 Section 1563(a) defines
32 I.R.C. § 541.
11 Manipulation may also be precluded by drafting a statute so as to penalize a taxpayer
who meets the definitional requirements at any time during the taxable year. The personal
holding company provisions partially adopt this approach. Under I.R.C. § 542(a)(2), a com-
pany satisfies the stock ownership test if "at any time during the last half of the taxable year"
the 50% test is met.
"d An example of such an approach already found in the tax law is the five-year active
business requirement of I.R.C. § 355(a)(3).
," Examples include the surtax exemption, I.R.C. § 11(d), the credit for the accumulated
earnings tax, I.R.C. § 535(c)(2)-(3), and the $25,000 limitation amount for the investment
credit. I.R.C. § 46(a)(3).
" H.R. RFs. No. 749, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963), reprinted in 1964-1 C.B. pt. 2, at 125,
240-241; S. RIe. No. 830, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), reprinted in 1964-1 C.B. pt. 2, at 505,
652-53.
11 I.R.C. § 1561 covers the surtax exemption, the accumulated earnings credit, and the
limitation on the small business deduction of life insurance companies. The investment tax
credit $25,000 limitation is covered by I.R.C. § 46(a)(6). I.R.C. § 269 is also used to attack
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a "controlled group" in terms of stock ownership: 8 if specified
shareholders own given percentages of a corporation's stock, that
corporation is deemed a member of a controlled group of corpora-
tions.
Section 1563's rules for constructive ownership99 treat an op-
tionholder as owning the underlying stock."'0 If, for example, A cor-
poration owns 20% of B corporation stock and has an option to
acquire the other 80%, B is considered wholly owned by A and
consequently not entitled to its own set of tax benefits.1 ' Without
multiple corporations. See Your Host, Inc. v. Commissioner, 489 F.2d 957 (2d Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 829 (1974); Napsky v. Commissioner, 371 F.2d 189 (7th Cir. 1966): Made
Rite Inv. Co. v. Commissioner, 357 F.2d 647 (9th Cir. 1966).
Section 1563's attribution rule might appear inconsistent with the treatment of options
in the consolidated return context, where option attribution is not required. I.R.C. § 1561,
like the consolidated returns provisions, is intended to assure that a single enterprise be taxed
as a single enterprise. For a discussion of the purpose of I.R.C. § 1561, see Fairfax Auto Parts
Inc. v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 798, 803 (1976). If options do not give the holder a sufficient
interest in the corporation to allow the filing of consolidated returns, then holding options
should not be sufficient to invoke the enterprise theory of § 1561. The difference in treatment
is required because, unlike the consolidated return provisions, § 1561 is punitive. The incen-
tive for using options as a tax avoidance mechanism is thus greater under § 1561.
11 I.R.C. § 1563(a)(1) defines a parent-subsidiary controlled group as one or more chains
of corporations connected with a common parent corporation through 80% or more in stock
ownership. A brother-sister controlled group, as defined by I.R.C. § 1563(a)(2), is one involv-
ing two or more corporations, if five or fewer persons or individuals, estates, or trusts own
80% of each corporation and such ownership is essentially pro rats, i.e., more than 50% of
the stock of each corporation is owned by persons having indentical interests in the corpora-
tion. For a general discussion of these definitions, see Shapiro, New Multiple Corporation
Surtax Exemption Rules, 29 N.Y.U. INsT. ON FED. TAX. 567 (1971).
," I.R.C. § 1563(e).
11 I.R.C. § 1563(e)(1). The language used is identical to that used in I.R.C. §§ 318(a)(4)
& 544(a)(3). I.R.C. § 1563(f)(3)(B) provides that the constructive ownership rules operate
only where their effect is to make the corporation a controlled corporation. Thus the grantor
of an option, rather than the grantee, will be regarded as the owner of the stock if the grantor
satisfies the definitional requirements of I.R.C. § 1563. Northwestern Steel & Supply Co. v.
Commissioner, 60 T.C. 356 (1973); North American Indus. v. Commissioner, 33 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1275 (1974).
101 Options are also relevant to I.R.C. § 1563 through the concept of excluded stock, i.e.,
stock excluded from the denominator in calculating the percentage of ownership. I.R.C. §§
1563(c)(2)(A)(iii), (B) (ii) provide that stock owned by an employee is excluded if the stock is
subject to conditions that run in favor of the parent (for parent-subsidiary controlled groups)
or in favor of common owners (for brother-sister controlled groups). In order for the stock to
be excluded, the employee must be restricted in his right to dispose of it. Courts have held
that stock owned by an employee subject to a 30-day option granted to a corporation, con-
trolled by the parent corporation, to purchase the stock upon the death or termination of
employment is to be treated as excluded stock. See, e.g., Mid-America Indus., Inc. v. United
States, 477 F.2d 1029 (8th Cir. 1973); Crow-Burlingame Co. v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 785
(1976). The regular option attribution rule is not applicable because the grantee is a corpora-
tion formed for the parent or common owner by a friendly third party, rather than the parent
or common owner itself. For example, the grantee in Mid-America Industries was a corpora-
tion formed and owned by the parent's attorneys and accountant.
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this rule, options would provide obvious possibilities for circum-
venting the controlled corporation provisions. A shareholder could
transfer stock subject to an option to a friendly outside party to
avoid section 1563's ownership tests, while retaining control over the
stock. However, section 1563(e) (1),102 providing for option attribu-
tion, is unnecessarily broad. The potential abuses can be remedied
without requiring attribution of the underlying stock for all options.
Rules 1 and 2 are sufficient to prevent the use of options to avoid
classification as a controlled corporation. Under the rules, options
are attributed only when it is likely that the optionholder exercises
control over the grantor and thus over the stock that the grantor
owns. Abuses of sections 1561 and 1563 through the use of options
are unlikely to occur without the element of control; option attribu-
tion should not extend beyond this point. '
IV. INADEQUATE ATTRIBUTION TO THE OPTIONHOLDER
A. Excess Business Holdings Tax
Section 4943 of the Internal Revenue Code imposes a penalty
tax on the excess business holdings of private foundations. Excess
business holdings are defined as those holdings in a business enter-
prise that a private foundation must dispose of in order for the
remaining holdings in the enterprise to be considered permitted
holdings.04 A private foundation is permitted to hold 20% of a corpo-
ration's voting stock; the 20% limitation is reduced by the percen-
tage of voting stock owned by disqualified persons.' 5 The definition
of disqualified person encompasses those likely to have significant
control over the foundation's operations, such as substantial contri-
butors and foundation managers.' 8 Section 4943 imposes an initial
tax of 5% of the value of the excess holdings'7 and an additional tax
'" I.R.C. § 1563(e)(1).
,, The status-oriented controlled corporation provisions do not require the application
of the transaction-oriented Rule 3.
,"I I.R.C. § 4943(c)(1).
'05 I.R.C. § 4943(c)(2). Under I.R.C. § 4943(c)(2)(B), a private foundation may own up
to 35% of the voting stock if individuals who are not disqualified persons can be shown to
effectively control the corporation.
I" The definition of disqualified person includes not only substantial contributors, I.R.C.
§ 4946(a)(1)(A), and foundation managers, I.R.C. § 4946(a)(1)(B), but also those who have a
20% ownership interest in an entity (i.e., a corporation, partnership, trust, or unincorporated
enterprise) which is a substantial contributor. I.R.C. § 4946(a)(1)(C). Such a party will be
referred to as a 20% owner. The definition also encompasses family members of substantial
contributors, foundation managers, and 20% owners, I.R.C. § 4946(a)(1)(D), and entities in
which the persons listed above have a 35% interest. I.R.C. §§ 4946(a)(1)(E)-(G). Finally,
certain related foundations are disqualified persons. I.R.C. § 4946(a)(1)(H).
I" I.R.C. § 4943(a)(1).
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equal to 200% of the excess holdings if they are not eliminated by
the close of the correction period."' 8
The excess business holdings tax was enacted as part of the Tax
Reform Act of 196919 to meet concerns about the use of foundations
to maintain control of family corporations. Congress believed that
the managers of foundations that owned a significant interest in a
corporation would divert their attention to the business and away
from their charitable duties. Even if the charitable purpose domi-
nated, the business could be run so as to compete unfairly with other
businesses whose owners pay taxes on the income from the enter-
prise.110 Section 4943 provides for a confiscatory tax designed as a
strong incentive for foundations to reduce their business holdings to
the permitted level.1 '
Because the tax is a direct penalty on stock ownership, attribu-
tion rules are especially important. Section 4943(d) (1) provides that
in determining the business holdings of a private foundation or a
disqualified person, any stock owned directly or indirectly by or for
a corporation, partnership, estate, or trust is to be considered pro-
portionately owned by its shareholders, partners, or beneficiaries.
The section's provision for family attribution includes attribution
from members of the families of substantial contributors or founda-
tion managers. 12 Options are expressly treated in proposed regula-
tions providing that a person holding an option to acquire stock is
not considered the owner of the stock until the option is exercised.
113
This proposed regulation is consistent with statements in the legis-
lative history that the conversion features of convertible bonds and
108 I.R.C. § 4943(b). The correction period is defined by I.R.C. § 4943(d)(3) as the period
ending 90 days after the mailing of a notice of deficiency with respect to the 5% tax, or 90
days after the conclusion of litigation over the liability, or within such further period as may
be granted for orderly disposition of the excess holdings. See generally Bumpas, Section 4943:
An Overview, 27 TAx LAW. 263 (1973); Kauder, Excess and Permitted Holding of Private
Foundations: A Critique of the Treasury's Construction of Section 4943, 30 TAx L. REV. 101
(1974); Plumb, Avoiding the 200% Tax on Excess Holdings for 20 to 50% Owned Private
Foundations, 34 J. TAX. 296 (1971).
' Pub. L. No. 91-172, tit. I, § 101(b), 83 Stat. 507.
10 H.R. REP. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1969); S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. 39 (1969).
" Congress expected that the 200% tax would lead the foundations to voluntary compli-
ance and that the tax itself would rarely be imposed. S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
33 (1969).
Stock held at the time the law was enacted is covered by I.R.C. § 4943(c)(4), which allows
gradual dispostion of excess holdings and prescribes different percentages of ownership as
constituting excess business holdings. Special provisions also allow gradual dispositi6 n of
excess holdings acquired by gift or bequest. See I.R.C. § 4943(c)(5)-(6).
"I I.R.C. § 4946(a)(1)(D).
,,3 Prop. Reg. § 53.4943-7(a).
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other securities are not to be considered voting stock.,
Although the absence of option attribution is supported by the
legislative history, it opens the door for tax avoidance. Foundations
and disqualified persons can place their shares with friendly outside
parties, subject to an option to repurchase. Such arrangements are
similar to those that appeared immediately after the enactment of
the personal holding company provisions, prompting Congress to
enact the Code's first option attribution rules."' Option attribution
is necessary to meet the substantial incentive to avoid the punitive
excess business holdings tax. Rules 1 and 2 answer this need by
attributing stock ownership to the option holder when it is reasona-
ble to assume that the option is part of a tax-avoidance scheme.",
Rule 3 is not necessary in this context. The excess business holdings
tax is not triggered by any specific transaction or date, but is in-
curred whenever the foundation's holdings exceed the permissible
level." 7 There is no incentive to use options to create a temporary
artificial situation that would require the invocation of Rule 3.
B. Section 267
Section 267(a)(1) disallows deductions for losses on the sale or
exchange of property between related parties. For example, no de-
duction is allowed for a loss realized in a sale between a corporation
and an individual who directly or indirectly owns more than 50% of
the value of its outstanding stock."8 Section 267(c) provides yet
another set of rules outlining when a party will be regarded as own-
ing stock."' These rules are similar to those in sections 318,12 544,121
"I S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (1969). This provision also serves to solve a
possible double counting problem. Double counting would occur if a substantial contributor
grants an option to the foundation and the shares were treated as owned by the foundation
and by the substantial contributor in determining whether the 20% ownership test was met.
The regulation is one way of prohibiting double inclusion of the same shares. See Bumpas,
supra note 108.
"' See text and notes at notes 57-62 supra.
' See text and notes at notes 70-75 supra.
,, I.R.C. § 4943(a)(1).
,, I.R.C. § 267(b)(2). In addition to I.R.C. § 267(b)(2), two other provisions of § 267
involve stock ownership. I.R.C. § 267(b)(3) provides that losses on sales between two corpora-
tions will not be recognized if more than 50% of the stock of each is owned directly or
indirectly by the same individual or if either corporation is a personal holding company or
a foreign personal holding company. I.R.C. § 267(b)(8) precludes loss recognition on a sale
between a fiduciary of a trust and corporation more than 50% of whose stock is owned directly
or indirectly by or for the trust or by or for a person who is the grantor of the trust.
"' I.R.C. § 267(c). These attribution rules are also used in several other sections of the
Code, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 178, 179, 341, 1235.
I- I.R.C. § 318.
121 I.R.C. § 544.
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and 156312 covering the constructive ownership of stock by various
family members, partners, and interested entities. Section 267 does
not, however, include an option attribution rule.
The status of option attribution under section 267 is uncertain.
In Moore v. Commissioner, 121 the only decision with even tangential
relevance, the Fifth Circuit held that an individual with a binding
contract to purchase stock owns the stock for the purposes of section
267. The court therefore disallowed the loss on the sale of an asset
from the taxpayer to the corporation whose stock he had contracted
to buy. The significant difference between a binding contract and
an option diminishes the relevance of Moore. An optionholder incurs
no liability in refusing to exercise his option; a promisor to a con-
tract is liable if he fails to perform. Thus Moore is not authority for
treating an optionholder as the owner of the underlying shares.
Several commentators, 4 believing that optionholders are not
to be treated as stockholders under section 267,'2 find that the
section presents opportunities for tax avoidance through the use of
options.'26 For example, an individual who holds an option to buy
50% of a corporation's stock might sell an asset to that corporation
at a loss, then exercise his option. Section 267, first enacted in 1934,
is intended to prevent transactions that occur solely to recognize a
loss for tax purposes. 27 The theory underlying the section is that the
seller of an asset must totally divest himself of any interest in the
asset in order to recognize a loss realized on the sale. If the purchaser
is a related party, it is questionable whether the seller has absolutely
disposed of his interest. The seller may still be deriving benefits
from and exercising control over the asset through the related party.
Given these possibilities for tax abuse, Congress concluded that a
sale to a related party is not a sufficient divestiture to justify loss
recognition.
Section 267 already attributes stock ownership from family
members, partners, and interested entities. The problem is how to
22 I.R.C. § 1563.
11 Prentiss D. Moore, 17 T.C. 1030 (1951), aff'd, 202 F.2d 45 (5th Cir. 1953).
,2 Ricketts, supra note 68; Reilly, supra note 5, at 274; REICH, RELATED TAXPAY-
Ens-LossES, EXPENsEs, INTEREST (1975) (BNA Tax Management Portfolio No. 102).
"I The most convincing argument supporting this interpretation of § 267 is that when
'Congress intends option attribution it says so explicitly, as in I.R.C. §§ 318, 544 & 1563. See
also text and notes at notes 130-41 infra.
'U Ricketts, supra note 68, at 26; Reilly, supra note 5, at 274; REicH, supra note 124, at
11.
12 H.R. REP. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. pt. 2, at 554;
Hearings on Revenue Revision of 1934 Before House Comm. on Ways and Means, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess. 134 (1934) (statement of R. Magill).
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treat a sale by T to X corporation when T owns less than 50% of
the value of X's stock but has an option to purchase sufficient stock
from A to put himself over the 50% level. Because section 267 is a
punitive provision, the incentive for manipulating stock ownership
through the use of options is significant. The section should be
expanded to include attribution from options. 128 An option attribu-
tion provision should focus on the relationship between T and A and
the means by which A acquired his stock. If A acquired his stock in
a transaction in which T was a moving party, A may be a friendly
party whom T is using to avoid the 50% ownership test. Rules 1 and
2 can prevent this abuse. Under these rules, T would be considered
the owner of the stock A holds subject to T's option, since A is
presumably under T's control. Even if A is not a friendly party
under T's control, T might sell the asset to X corporation and
shortly thereafter exercise the option. In this situation, T never
really lost control of the asset and the loss on the sale should not be
recognized. Losses should be disallowed regardless of who the gran-
tor of the option is, if the option is exercised within a specified
period after the sale. Rule 3 can achieve this result.129 Together, the
three rules provide the option attribution provisions needed to pre-
vent the circumvention of section 267.
The inadequacy of section 267's attribution rules is made even
more apparent by recent amendments to section 1239.110 Section
1239 provides that the gain on the sale or exchange of depreciable
property between certain related parties is taxed as ordinary income
rather than as capital gain.'31 Related parties include an individual
who owns 80% of the value of a corporation's stock and that corpora-
tion, 32 and two or more corporations where one individual owns 80%
of the value of each corporation's stock.'33
Section 1239 is intended to discourage taxpayers from stepping
up the basis of property by selling it to a related party.'34 For exam-
'" The absence of any option attribution rules for I.R.C. § 267 is not surprising. The
section was enacted three years before option attribution first entered the tax law, and that
entrance was initially confined to the personal holding company provisions. See text and
notes at notes 57-62 supra. Although Congress has since expanded option attribution, it has
failed to rectify the omission in § 267's constructive ownership rules.
In The language of Rule 3 must be modified slightly from its formulation for redemptions
to be applicable to § 267. In this context, "within five years of the redemption" is changed
to read "within five years after the date of the sale."
13 Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2129, 90 Stat. 1922.
" I.R.C. § 1239(a).
"3 I.R.C. § 1239(b)(2).
" I.R.C. § 1239(b)(3).
"' See United States v. Parker, 376 F.2d 402, 407 (5th Cir. 1967); Mitchell v. Commis-
sioner, 300 F.2d 533, 536-37 (4th Cir. 1962).
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ple, a corporation owning property with a low basis is not entitled
to substantial depreciation deductions. Without section 1239, the
corporation could sell the asset to its controlling shareholder and
treat the gain as a capital gain. If the shareholder held the property
in his trade or business or for the production of income, he would
be entitled to depreciation deductions on the purchase price, i.e., on
the stepped-up basis. 3' Section 1239 creates a substantial disincen-
tive for such transactions by requiring the seller to treat the gain on
the sale as ordinary income rather than capital gain. The theory for
penalizing such a transaction is the same theory underlying section
267: the transfer of ownership between related parties is not a suffi-
cient divestiture of the seller's interest in the asset to entitle him to
favorable tax treatment.
As originally enacted in 1951, section 1239 contained narrow
attribution rules providing that an individual constructively owned
the stock of his spouse, minor children, and minor grandchildren.
Although a regulation 3 ' provided that stock ownership included
beneficial as well as legal ownership, the courts refused to apply this
rule. 31 In particular, the government's attempt to attribute stock
ownership from options was rejected. 3 '
Faced with this judicial interpretation of section 1239, Congress
realized that the narrow attribution rules impeded the section's
effectiveness. The Tax Reform Act of 1976 amends section 1239 to
make section 318's option attribution rules"9 applicable in deter-
mining stock ownership for the purposes of section 1239.40 Con-
gress's recognition of the need for option attribution rules for section
"I The same benefit could be obtained in a sale from the shareholder to the corporation
or in a sale from one related corporation to another.
'u Treas. Reg. § 1.239-1 (1957).
" E.g., Rothenberg v. United States, 350 F.2d 319 (10th Cir. 1965); Mitchell v. Commis-
sioner, 300 F.2d 533 (4th Cir. 1962).
A convincing legislative history supports the courts. The predecessor of § 1239, as pro-
posed by the House in 1951, contained several constructive ownership provisions. H.R. RsP.
No. 586, 82d Cong., 1st Sess (1951), reprinted in [1951] U.S. CODE CONG. & ADM. NEws 1781,
1807. In particular, stock owned by a corporation, partnership, estate, or trust was treated
as proportionately owned by its shockholders, partners, or beneficiaries. The Senate felt that
the House provisions were overbroad and would catch many nonabusive transactions. S. REP.
No. 781, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951), reprinted in [1951] U.S. CoDE CONG. & ADM. NEWS 1969,
2041. The law as finally enacted reflected the Senate's view. H.R. REP. No. 1213, 82d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1951), reprinted in [1951] U.S. CoDE CONG. & ADm. NEws 2121, 2135. It thus seems
clear that Congress did not intend broad constructive ownership provisions to be used in §
1239.
Trotz v.Commissioner, 361 F.2d 927 (10th Cir. 1966).
,3' S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. pt. 2, at 31 (1976).
2,0 I.R.C. § 1239(c).
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1239 makes the absence of such rules in section 267 even less justifi-
able. Both sections are premised on the same theory; both require
option attribution to prevent taxpayers from using options to avoid
the express statutory provisions."'
CONCLUSION
The need for attribution of stock ownership from stock options
is a function of the likelihood that the parties will use options to
avoid the consequences attached to stock ownership. Those sections
of the Code that are punitive or transaction oriented create the
greatest incentive for manipulation of stock ownership and thus
require option attribution. When attribution is needed, it should be
tailored to the purposes of the substantive tax provisions. Option
attribution rules should be sufficiently broad to prevent tax avoid-
ance, but sufficiently narrow to avoid encompassing arrangements
not motivated by a desire to manipulate stock ownership.
The option attribution rules proposed in this comment attempt
to delineate the appropriate scope of attribution in those sections
where attribution is appropriate. The first two rules limit option
attribution to those situations where an optionholder's presumed
control over the grantor makes manipulation likely. The third rule,
by attributing ownership when an option is exercised within a speci-
fied time period, bars a party from using stock options to manipu-
late stock ownership at the time of a transaction. The proposed rules
may still be over- or underinclusive, but they are significantly more
precise than current law.
Gary J. Winston
' The changes in I.R.C. § 1239 were a response to judicial decisions adverse to the
Commissioner on the issue of stock ownership. See notes 137-38 supra. By contrast, I.R.C. §
267(c) has generated little controversial litigation in the past decade.
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